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Abstract: It is well known that Dostoevsky’s 
Crime and Punishment reflects the 
intellectual milieu of the period of 
its conception. More specifically, the 
motivation of Raskolnikov’s crime is 
rooted in the nihilism of the radical 
intelligentsia of the period. In this article, 
the ideology of Raskolnikov is identified 
with the ideology of the representatives of 
the radical intelligentsia, namely Nikolai 
Chernyshevsky and Dimitri Pisarev. It also 
traces the continuity and discontinuity of 
the ideas of these thinkers. Finally, argues 
that Dostoevsky perceived the evolution and 
radicalization of the intelligentsia’s ideas 
through the lenses of the evolution and 
radicalization of the Left Hegelians, namely 
Feuerbach and Stirner, whose ideology 
influenced the Russian radical intelligentsia. 
Thus is brought to the fore the intellectual 
origins of the Russian radical intelligentsia’s 
nihilism, which was seminal to Dostoevsky’s 
Crime and Punishment.
Resumo: Como se sabe, Crime e 
Castigo, de Dostoiévski, reflete o meio 
intelectual do período de sua concepção. 
Mais especificamente, a motivação do 
crime de Raskólnikov está enraizada 
no niilismo da intelliguentsia radical 
do período. Neste artigo, a ideologia 
de Raskólnikov é identificada com a 
ideologia de Nikolai Tchernichévski 
e Dimítri Píssarev, representantes da 
intelliguentsia radical. Além disso, o artigo 
traça a continuidade e a descontinuidade 
das idéias destes pensadores. Por fim, 
argumenta que Dostoiévski percebe a 
evolução e a radicalização das ideias da 
intelliguentsia pelas lentes da evolução e 
radicalização dos hegelianos de esquerda, 
isto é, Feuerbach e Stirner, cuja ideologia 
influenciou a intelliguentsia radical russa. 
Por isso, são trazidas à tona as origens 
intelectuais do niilismo da intelliguentsia 
radical russa, seminal para Crime e Castigo, 
de Dostoiévski.
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In a well-known letter to Katkov, which was meant to 
convince him to publish “Crime and Punishment”, Dostoevsky 
described the novel he intended to write as a “psychological 
account of a crime ... The action is topical, set in the current 
year. A young student of lower-middle-class origin, who has 
been expelled from the university, and who lives in dire po-
verty, succumbs - through thoughtlessness and lack of strong 
convictions - to certain strange, “incomplete” ideas that are 
floating on the air, and decides to get out of his misery once 
and for all.”1 In what follows, I will try to identify these “”in-
complete” ideas that are floating on the air” during the period 
of conception of the novel and also to examine the way in 
which Dostoevsky drew his inevitable conclusions from them 
when he “completed” them. 
As is known, the two ideological sources of motivation that 
led Raskolnikov to commit a crime were the utilitarian moti-
ve and the Napoleonic motive.  Both motives have been asso-
ciated with two well-known members of the Russian radical 
intelligentsia of the 1860’s - the former with Nikolai Cherny-
shevsky, and the latter with Dmitri Pisarev, as Joseph Frank 
has shown.2 
 In his thesis “The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy”, 
which was published in 1860, five years before the publica-
tion of “Crime and Punishment”, Chernyshevsky endorses an 
unrestricted naturalism grounded in scientific materialism. 
Scientific materialism seemed to provide ammunition with 
which to fight any idealistic or religious, elevated view of man. 
1 Letter sent to Katkov during the first half of September 1865, when “Crime and Punish-
ment” was in its inception. In eds. Joseph Frank and David Goldstein, tr. Andrew MacAn-
drew, Selected Letters of Fyodor Dostoevsky (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick and 
London, 1987), p. 221.
2 Joseph Frank, Dostoevsky, vol. 4, The Miraculous Years, 1865-1871 (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1995), pp. 60-79.
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Hence, in keeping with this naturalism, among other things, 
Chernyshevsky proclaimed that there is no line of demarca-
tion between animals and humans, that free will is abolished 
in favour of a deterministic view of human agency, and, finally, 
that acts mistakenly understood as manifestations of altruism 
are in fact acts of egoism masquerading as the former: 
“People learned from experience that every man thinks only 
about himself, is more concerned about his own interests than 
he is about the interests of others, that he nearly always sa-
crifices the interests, honour and life of others to his own. In 
short, everybody learned that all people are egoists.”3  
 We should bear in mind that the role of the intelligentsia 
was conceived of as destructive, namely to demolish idealistic 
and metaphysical prejudices of the past that were seen as pil-
lars of the autocracy and the Church. Science and naturalism 
were seen as allies in the destruction of any last remnants of 
idealism. As David Benthea and Victoria Thorstensson write: 
“Natural science provided what appeared to be an indispensa-
ble means of organizing the material of life in a manner that 
applied to all; it was meaningful in that it made sense, and 
it was democratic in that it only recognized its own autho-
rity, not that of the Church, state, or traditional metaphysics.”4 
That is exactly what Chernyshevsky did when he set allegedly 
scientifically proven egoism against traditional, religious con-
ceptions of altruism. But destruction was conceived of as just 
a moment, a prelude to a new, promising life that was awaited 
after the ground was cleared. After all, it was Turgenev in “Fa-
thers and Sons” who castigated the young people by claiming 
that they did not have any plan for reconstruction after the 
ground was cleared. 
“At the present time, negation is the most useful of all... 
That’s our business now... The ground has to be cleared first.”5 
3 Nikolai Chernyshevsky, “The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy”, in Selected Philo-
sophical Essays (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1953), p. 120.
4 David Bethea and Victoria Thorstensson, “Darwin, Dostoevsky, and Russia’s Radical Youth”, 
Dostoevsky beyond Dostoevsky. Science, Religion, Philosophy, ed. Svetlana Evdokimova and 
Vladimir Golstein (Academic Studies Press, Boston 2016), p. 38.
5 Ivan Turgenev, Fathers and Sons, The Author on the Novel, Contemporary Reactions, 
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In “What is to be Done?”, which was destined to become the 
most influential Russian novel of the 19th century, Cherny-
shevsky took up Turgenev’s idea that negation does not ne-
cessarily contain the seeds of a new beginning and what will 
follow is unclear and qualified the egoism he had endorsed 
five years previously in the “Anthropological Principle of Phi-
losophy” as a rational egoism. Rationality will reconcile indi-
viduality with the collectivist values that Chernyshevsky, like 
all the members of the intelligentsia, espoused and would be 
conducive to the harmonious cooperation of interests in so-
ciety.  In addition, rationality would lead egoists to behave al-
truistically, once they came to know their true interest. Egoism 
would thus be transformed into self-abnegating altruism.
  Alongside rational egoism, the second constitutive ele-
ment in Chernyshevsky’s novel is the prominent, almost worl-
d-historical role he bestowed upon the intelligentsia. As the 
prospect that the peasant movement might lead to a general 
revolution began to fade following the first years of reforms 
and the regime simultaneously became increasingly strict, 
the tiny section of the population that comprised the intel-
ligentsia, the new people, were elevated to the status of the 
only bearers of hope. “The new people”, write Katz and Wag-
ner, “would reshape rather than simply react to the Russian 
environment... [This signalled both] a sense of mission, as well 
as alienation from the state and the rest of society.”6 
  Hence, we can identify an intrinsic tension in the thinking 
of Chernyshevsky. Egoism, whether qualified as rational or not, 
must fulfil the needs of the individual while also simultaneou-
sly underpinning his collectivist aspirations. Egoism is both 
individualistic and understood as providing the foundations 
for a society based on a harmonious cooperation of interests. 
It has to be simultaneously, individualistic and democratic. 
Essays in Criticism, ed. And tr. Ralph Matlaw, New York, Norton, 1966, p. 39, cited in Michael 
Allen Gillespie, Nihilism before Nietzsche, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1995, p. 
147.
6 Michael Katz and William Wagner, “Chernyshevsky, What is to be Done? And the Russian 
Intelligentsia”, in Nicolai Chernyshevsky, What Is To Be Done?, tr. Michael Katz (Cornell 
University Press, Ithaka and London 1989), pp. 20 and 2.
241
On the sources of Nihilism in Dostoevsky’s “Crime and Punishment”
  Dmitry Pisarev and other authors who wrote for the journal 
The Russian Word [Russkoe Slovo], would further radicalize 
the ideas of Chernyshevsky. Thus, for Pisarev and the other 
contributors to The Russian Word, the emancipation of the 
individual from the fetters of society - an intrinsically elitist 
value - would become an end in itself. It could no longer under-
pin collective ideas, such as agrarian socialism with its conco-
mitant glorification of the Russian peasantry, which Cherny-
shevsky endorsed.  “The Nihilists in the Russkoe Slovo,” writes 
Venturi, “put their trust and hopes mainly in themselves. They 
refused to believe either in the ruling classes or even in the 
myth of “the people” and “the peasants”. The “emancipation 
of the person”, (i.e. the formation of independent characters 
“who think critically”), was more important than social eman-
cipation.”7 With this loss of populist values, the rift between 
the intelligentsia and the people would become unbridgeab-
le. Zaitsev, who also wrote for The Russian Word, would even 
endorse Social Darwinism - a true anathema to any populist 
ideology. In addition, Zaitsev would adopt Jacobinism. For he 
insisted that the new members of the intelligentsia should 
not love the people, but rather act on their behalf. Echoes of 
Zaitsev’s Social Darwinism, with its intrinsic contempt for the 
people, have been identified in Crime and Punishment, in Ras-
kolnikov’s Napoleonic motive, namely the division of huma-
nity into “ordinary” and “extraordinary” people.8
  Dostoevsky followed closely the rift between the radicals of 
Chernyshevsky’s The   Contemporary and Pisarev’s The Rus-
sian World, dubbing it “the schism [Raskol] between the nihi-
lists”, in an article published in his journal in 1863.9 As known, 
7 Franco Venturi, Roots of Revolution. A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in 
Nineteenth Century Russia, tr. Francis Haskell (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, UK, 1960), p. 317. 
8 See David Bethea and Victoria Thorstensson, “Darwin Dostoevsky and Russia’s Radical 
Youth”, pp. 41-45.
9 On the rift between “The Contemporary” and “The Russian Word”, for which Chernyshevsky 
and Pisarev wrote respectively, see N.G.O. Pereira, “Challenging the principle of Authority: 
The polemic between Sovremennik and Russkoe Slovo, 1863-1865”, The Russian Review, 
(vol. 34, no.2, April 1975), pp. 137-150. For Dostoevsky’s article see F.M.Dostoevsky, 
“Gospodin Shchedrin, ili raskol v nigilistakh” in Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 30 vols. (Nauka, 
Leningrad, 1972-90, vol. XX), 102-4, cited in Richard Peace, “Nihilism” in A History of Russian 
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in “Notes from the Underground” (1864), Dostoevsky would 
sharply criticize (and mock) the first component of Cherny-
shevsky’s rational egoism, namely rationality. In Crime and 
Punishment, published between 1865 and 1866, he would chal-
lenge Chernyshevsky from another angle. That is to say, as I 
wish to argue, he now sees the radical intelligentsia’s rift bet-
ween Chernyshevsky and Pisarev through the prism of a pre-
vious rift that took place between two German Left Hegelians, 
namely, Ludwig Feuerbach and Max Stirner. Dostoevsky thus 
sees the passage from Chernyshevsky’s rational egoism to Pi-
sarev’s elitism, that signalled the degeneration of the populist 
collective values of the intelligentsia, through the lens of the 
degeneration of Feuerbach’s anthropology to Stirner’s egoism. 
 It is rarely noted that what sustained the collectivist aspi-
ration of Chernyshevsky’s egoism was not only rationality, 
but also the social character of Feuerbach’s anthropology. The 
strong influence of Feuerbach on Chernyshevsky is evidenced 
by the very title of Chernyshevsky’s thesis, “The Anthropolo-
gical Principle of Philosophy”. The fact that, in spite of the al-
lusion in the title, Feuerbach’s name and his anthropology are 
conspicuously absent in the actual content of the essay, is due 
to the fear of censorship. Chernyshevsky hints at this when 
he addresses the reader just a few pages before the end of his 
essay:
“But we have almost forgotten that the term “anthropologi-
cal” in the heading of our essays has still remained unexplai-
ned. What is this “anthropological principles in moral scien-
ces”? The reader has seen what this principle is from the very 
character of the essays.”10
 Similarly, in What is to be Done? (1863), written when Cher-
nyshevsky was in jail, again out of a fear of censorship, the 
name of Feuerbach is only hinted at and appears clothed in 
Aesopian language.
Thought, ed. William Leatherbarrow and Derek Offord (Cambridge University Press, USA 
2012), p.  139, n. 64. 
10 Nikolai Chernyshevsky, The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy, p. 132.
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“Maria Ivanych read the title [of the book] slowly: “On re-
ligion”, by Ludwig, that is, Louis XIV, Marya Aleksevna. It’s a 
book by Louis XIV. He was king of France, Marya Aleksevna.”11 
The fact that the main idea can be only hinted at, clothed 
in Aesopian language out of a fear of censorship, is stated 
openly, and surprisingly so, given that Dostoevsky was an for-
mer political convict and under surveillance - in Crime and 
Punishment. Raskolnikov’s main Napoleonic idea is alluded 
to towards the end of his published article, and Porfiry’s atten-
tion is drawn, not to the main bulk of the published article, but 
to an obscure allusion. 
“Most, most original, but... that wasn’t actually the part of 
your little article that interested me so much. It was rather a 
certain idea that you introduced at the end of the piece, but 
which you unfortunately alluded only to passing.”12 
Raskolnikov admits the published article contains only an 
indirect allusion to his Napoleonic idea:
“None of that’s actually in the article, it’s merely alluded to, 
obscurely.”13 
And he explicitly attributes its incompleteness to the fear of 
censorship:
“I don’t even think that the article which said that would be 
allowed into print.”14 
We must remember that censorship was tightened after 
1862, something that is mentioned in the novel in passing, 
when Svidrigailov says to Raskolnikov: “I wonder if you re-
member how, a few years ago, when we were still in the era of 
beneficent glasnost...”15
We could say that Porfiry (and implicitly the readers of the 
novel) is being invited to engage in a form of interpretation 
that resembles a decoding. 
11 Nikolai Chernyshevsky, What Is To Be Done?, 112
12 Fyodor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment [hereafter referred to as CP, tr. David McDuff, 
Penguin 1991, Part 3, chapter 5, p. 311.
13 Fyodor Dostoevsky, CP, Part 3, Chapter 5, p. 316.
14 Fyodor Dostoevsky, CP, Part 3, Chapter 5, p. 312.
15 Fyodor Dostoevsky, CP, Part 4, Chapter 1, p. 339.
244
Markos Galounis
We shall therefore examine briefly Feuerbach’s philosophy 
that was fundamental for Chernyshevsky. We will then look at 
its criticism by Stirner and, finally, we will examine the way it 
is reflected in Dostoevsky’s “Crime and Punishment”.
Feuerbach’s new philosophy was based on a radical critique 
of religion and a simultaneous humanist or anthropological 
interpretation of the human experience. According to Feuer-
bach’s “Essence of Christianity”, which was published in 1841, 
religion objectifies humanity’s essence, such that the “divi-
ne” is only a projection of the “human” reflected in an ideal 
form. “One of Feuerbach’s primary objectives in the “Essence 
of Christianity” was to demonstrate that the alleged universal 
“objects” to which man related in religion and theology were 
illusions. These “objects” were “nothing else than the subject’s 
own nature taken objectively”; they were “objectifications” of 
man’s own essential nature as a rational, emotive and volitio-
nal being,” John Toews writes.16 
Man’s liberation is nothing other than a reclaiming of at-
tributes traditionally assigned to God. So the emancipating 
role of philosophy consists in the healing of man’s alienation 
through the transformation of religion to anthropology. In 
Feuerbach’s own terms: “Man is the God of Men.”17 With Feuer-
bach’s transformation of theology into anthropology, the real 
essence of Christianity no longer resides in the God-man but 
in man as man. We have a twofold act: a divinization of man, 
who, in a Promethean way, usurps the predicates traditionally 
attributed to God, and a simultaneous humanization of philo-
sophy. We recall that the title of Chernyshevsky’s thesis was 
‘The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy.”
 Once Anthropology replaces theology and becomes the pre-
vailing explanation of man, the role of faith in Christianity is 
replaced by “love”. Instead of saying “God is love”, Feuerbach’s 
humanism merely inverts the subject and the predicate and 
16 John Edward Toews, Hegelianism. The path toward dialectical humanism, 1805-1841, 
Cambridge University Press, USA 1980, p. 342.
17 Cited in John F. Welsh, Max Stirner’s Dialectical Egoism, A New Interpretation, Lexington 
Books, UK, p. 17
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asserts that “love is the supreme being”. Love, unmediated by 
any external entity such as the Church or tradition, becomes 
the new faith of this form of humanism. “Just as he who has 
experienced love has experienced everything,” Feuerbach 
wrote, “so he who has comprehended love has comprehended 
everything; comprehend love and you have comprehended 
God and everything.”18
Feuerbach’s influence on the novel is evidenced by the 
name of the goddess in Vera’s first dream. The goddess says: 
“I have many different names. I tell each person the name he 
should use. You shall call me Love of Humanity. That’s my real 
name.”19
The elevation of love to the essence of human feeling in 
Feuerbach’s humanism also has strong social implications as 
the individual transcends himself through the self-sacrificing 
activity of love in order to form a post-Christian social order. 
“This process of human self-actualization and self-knowledge 
could be conceived only as a collective act of a ‘“we”’ rather 
than ‘“I”’, writes Toews.20 It is significant that Chernyshevsky, 
in his novel echoing Feuerbach’s collective ideal sustained 
by his notion of love, names the goddess in Vera’s first dream 
“Love of Humanity”: “I have many different names. I tell each 
person the name he should use. You shall call me Love of Hu-
manity. That’s my real name.”21 
In an insightful essay, Sergei Kibalnic indicates the pivo-
tal role Feuerbach’s notion of love for humanity plays in “The 
Brothers Karamazov.”22 For Dostoevsky, love of humanity is 
inept if it is not accompanied by a belief in the immortality of 
the soul. It is non-coincidental, as Kibalnic observes, that the 
two people that endorse the Feuerbachian notion of love for 
18 Cited in John Edward Toews, Hegelianism, p. 195.
19 Nikolai Chernyshevsky, What Is To Be Done?, p. 131.
20 John Edward Toews, Hegelianism, p.345.
21 Nikolai Chernyshevsky, What is to Be Done?, p.131.
22 Sergei Kibalnic, “If there’s no immortality of the soul,… everything is lawful”: On the Philo-




humanity in “The Brothers Karamazov,” namely Rakitin and 
Madame Khokhlakov, are both depicted with a touch of irony. 
A trace of irony is also evident in the confession of a doctor, 
related by Zosima: “I love humanity,” he said, “but I wonder at 
myself. The more I love humanity in general, the less I love 
man in particular.”23 
 More prosaically and directly in his The Diary of a Writer, 
Dostoevsky again refers to Feuerbach’s notion of love of hu-
manity:
“Those people who deprived humanity of its faith in its 
own immortality want to replace that faith, in the sense of 
the meaning of the highest purpose of existence, by “love 
for humanity,” those people, I say, are raising their hands 
against themselves; for in place of love for humanity they 
plant in the heart of one who lost his faith the seed of hatred 
for humanity.”24 
The elevation of love to the essence of human feeling in 
Feuerbach’s humanism also has strong social implications. “If 
instead of saying God is love, it is asserted that love is divine, 
then love for the essence of man becomes the basis of trans-
forming social relations and recreating post-Christian social 
order,” writes John Welsh.25 
The philosophy of Feuerbach was influential in the circle 
of Belinsky, of which the young Dostoevsky was part in the 
1840’s. But a book by another Left Hegelian, The Ego and its 
Own, by Max Stirner, published in 1845, strongly criticizing 
Feuerbach’s philosophy, was also read in this very same cir-
cle. This book was translated into Russian and was received 
with awe by Belinsky, for, as we shall see, the type of egoism 
promoted by Stirner cancelled any collectivistic aspirations 
intrinsic to Feuerbach’s philosophy. Annenkov recalls the 
huge impact Stirner’s book had on Belinsky: “After becoming 
23 Cited in Sergei Kibalnik, “If there’s no immortality of the soul,… everything is lawful”: On 
the Philosophical Basis of Ivan Karamazov’s Idea,” p. 174.
24 Cited in Sergei Kibalnic, “If there’s no immortality of the soul,… everything is lawful”: On 
the Philosophical Basis of Ivan Karamazov’s Idea bid., p. 174.
25 John F. Welsh, Max Stirner’s Dialectical Egoism. A New Interpretation (Lexington Books, 
UK, 2010), p. 66.
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acquainted with Stirner’s book, Belinsky took closely to heart 
the problem it raised and tried to find its solution. It turned 
out that there was a very important moral question in it for 
him.”26 Another possible source of Dostoevsky’s knowledge of 
Stirner’s book was Petrashevsky’s gatherings and, more spe-
cifically, N. Speshnev, who had an influence on the young Dos-
toevsky and who, as Kibalnic notes, like many other members 
of Petrashevsky’s circle, shared Stirner’s ideas.27 
Stirner criticized all the main tenets of Feuerbach’s philoso-
phy, the transformation of theology into anthropology and the 
notion of “love of humankind”, understood as a foundation for 
a society of the future. Regarding the transformation of theo-
logy into anthropology, Stirner rejected the idea that Feuerba-
ch had produced a critique of religion, instead asserting that 
it had merely reproduced the central features of Christianity. 
It may be true that Feuerbach rejected God as a transcendent 
subject, but by projecting the divine predicates onto man, he 
was preserving a trace of the sacred, now attributed to man. 
As David Leopold says: “Because Feuerbach’s transformative 
criticism leaves the divine predicates untouched, he is char-
ged with allowing the sacred to remain, if not as God then as 
‘Man with a capital M!’.” Feuerbach had not revealed human 
nature as it was, but rather deified a purely prescriptive ac-
count of what being human involved. Thus leaving the ‘“real 
kernel”’ of religion, the positing of an ‘“essence over me”’ (p. 
46), intact. Feuerbach’s achievement was a “change of mas-
ters” (p.55), that actually established a more complete tyranny 
than before, tying the individual even more securely to a di-
vine ruler.”28 For Stirner, Feuerbach’s attempt to create a new 
humanism is really only a resurrection of religion, because it 
26 P.V. Annenkov, The Extraordinary Decade, Literary Memoirs, tr. Irwin B. Titunik (Ann Arbor, 
The University of Michigan Press, USA 1968), p. 211.
27 Sergei Kibalnic, “’If there’s no immortality of the soul… everything is lawful”: On the Philo-
sophical Basis of Ivan Karamazov’s Idea,”, p. 169. For Stirner’s influence on Dostoevsky, see 
also Takayoshi Shimizu, “Dostoevsky and Max Stirner”, paper given at the XIV International 
Dostoevsky Symposium, Naples, June 2010, Abstracts, ed. Michela Vendith, p. 102.
28 David Leopold, “Introduction”, in Max Stirner, The Ego and Its Own, tr. Steven Tracy Bying-
ton, ed. David Leopold, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. xx. The citations are from Max 
Stirner, The Ego and its Own, pp. 55, 46 and 55 respectively.
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intends to transform the human into the divine. Feuerbach’s 
humanism, merely destroyed the old gods, while creating a 
new supreme being: Man.
In place of Feuerbach’s idealized humanism, Stirner posits 
the particularity of the ego and its own. The person who as-
serts ownership over his or her life, body, values and identity
recognizes nothing but himself. He does not need to free 
himself because at the start he rejects everything outside 
himself because he prizes nothing more than himself - be-
cause he starts from himself and comes to himself… Owness 
is my whole being and existence, it is I myself. I am free of 
what I am rid of, owner of what I have in my power and con-
trol. My own I am at all times and under all circumstances, if 
I know how to have myself and I do not throw myself away 
on others.”29 
As Toews says: “Stirner, like Nietzsche, conceived the emer-
gence of the sovereign individual who was the self-sufficient, 
self-affirming master of his own world as the highest product 
and imminent telos of world history and psychological deve-
lopment, as the ‘“laughing heir’” of the millennial labors and 
sufferings of humankind.
  Stirner’s belligerent and rhetorical affirmation [was] that 
the ephemeral present existence of the continually self-crea-
ting and self-consuming individual ego was the only “absolu-
te” reality in a universe finally stripped of the last illusions of 
the sacred.”30   
In addition, Stirner dismisses Feuerbach’s generalized, uni-
versal, abstract love as a form of piety. It becomes a “fixed idea”, 
once fanatical loyalty to the humanist spooks replaces fanati-
cal loyalty to the spooks of religion. It is reflected in everyday 
life as morality, which becomes the new piety of humanism. 
“Moral faith is as fanatical as religious faith”,31 and morality is 
the most fixed of ideas in modernity. Abstract love and mora-
lity become the primary forms of social control over any ma-
nifestations of transgression, egoism or individuality.
29 Max Stirner, The Ego and its Own, pp.149 and 143.
30 John Edward Toews, Hegelianism, p. 368.
31 Max Stirner, The Ego and its Own, p. 45.
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Stirner discerned two kinds of love. The “bad case” was 
Feuerbach’s concept of love, in which the ego is sacrificed. 
Opposed to this is his version of love, the egoistic love, whi-
ch does not involve the sacrifice of our autonomy. In Stirner’s 
conception of egoistic love, self-mastery is to be attained and 
preserved against any danger of subordinating oneself to ex-
ternal or internal authorities. Egoistic love demanded “not 
only that we avoid subordinating ourselves to others, but also 
that we avoid submitting to our own appetites or ends,” says 
Leopold.32 Self-mastery, seen as a constant achievement of the 
ego, distinguishes egoistic love, on the one hand, and tradi-
tional conceptions of love, one the other. “I am my own only 
when I am master of myself, instead of being mastered… by 
anything else”.33 In egoistic love, the way in which the ego re-
lates to others is “enjoyment”, and the way in which it relates 
to itself is by acquiring an emotional detachment towards its 
appetites and ideas, instead of being dominated by them. We 
shall return to this tenet of Stirner’s egoistic love later.
Finally, Stirner’s conception of egoism also has political im-
plications that place him again in opposition to Feuerbach. If 
what was “God” and “heaven” among the ancients is “huma-
nity” and “society” among the moderns, and the last two are 
understood to have social control functions, then Stirner’s ego 
signals a resistance to both religious mystification and politi-
cal dominion. “The unique one” exists in opposition to the sta-
te and society. He asserts uniqueness and independence from 
cultural and collectivist constructs and societal constraints: 
“The own will of me is the state’s destroyer; it is therefore de-
nounced by the state as “self-will”. Own will and state are po-
wers in deadly hostility, between which no “perpetual peace” 
is possible.”34 
As John Welsh says, “Stirner thus posited a fundamental 
opposition between society and the individual. But unlike 
other theorists, Stirner saw no need to reconcile the two, or 
32 David Leopold, “Introduction”, p. xxiii.
33 Max Stirner, The Ego and Its Own, p. 153,
34 Max Stirner, The Ego and Its Own, p. 175.
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to resolve the contradiction in favor of society or a presumed 
reciprocity between society and the individual… Stirner refra-
mes the relationship between the individual and society as a 
conflict over ownership or owness.”35 Being in perpetual con-
flict with the state, Stirner’s ego does not recognize any sort 
of obligation whatsoever, including the obligation to obey the 
law. Instead of a reconciliation between the two, the annihila-
tion of the state is proposed:
“Therefore, we two, the state and I, are enemies. I, the 
egoist, have not at heart the welfare of this ‘human society’. 
I sacrifice nothing to it, I only utilize it; but to be able to uti-
lize it completely, I transform it rather into my property and 
my creature; that is, I annihilate it, and form in its place the 
Union of Egoists.”36 
It is no coincidence that, Stirner, given his aspiration to 
achieve the emancipation of the individual from all commu-
nal ties, rejected the contemporary forms of socialism and 
communism which other Left Hegelians had endorsed, as se-
cular religions. “The tasks of revolution, however, demanded 
self-renunciation devotion to a common goal, commitment to 
supra-personal values, belief in an objective meaning in his-
tory - that is, a denial of precisely those values of individual 
autonomy that Stirner endorsed,“ writes Toews.37 Needless to 
say this fundamental conflict between society and Stirner’s 
ego renders any conception of society problematic. And it is 
precisely, Stirner’s effort to conceive of a society based on a 
union of egoists that has been criticized as unfeasible – and 
this issue is reflected in Crime and Punishment, as we shall 
see presently.
Returning to Dostoevsky’s novel, we see that both of Ras-
kolnikov’s motives - the utilitarian taken from Chernyshevsky 
and the Napoleonic, taken from Pisarev - have an intrinsic hu-
manistic and social value. While with the utilitarian motive 
the societal dimension is apparent (to do one bad action in 
order to expiate it with more good ones), with the Napoleonic 
35 John Welsh, Max Stirner’s Dialectical Egoism, pp. 94-5 and 96.
36 Max Stirner, The Ego and its Own, p. 161.
37 John Edwards Toews, Hegelianism, p. 369.
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it is latent. Besides its strong existential dimension, namely 
that Raskolnikov kills in order to test with his deed whether 
he is a Napoleon or a louse, the models deemed transgressors 
of humanity step over conventional morality in order to resha-
pe society according to their laws, in very Promethean way. 
Thus the shift from the utilitarian to the Napoleonic does not 
risk their societal dimension degenerating into bare egoism. 
As we have already seen both are posited within the philo-
sophy of Feuerbach and its collectivist dimension which in-
fluenced Chernyshevsky.
  It has been noted many times that the real transgressor 
of the novel is not Raskolnikov but Svidrigailov. Dostoevsky 
introduces him masterfully in the middle of the novel with a 
highly symbolic stepping over (“perestupat’” in Russian), whi-
ch is related to the Russian word for crime (“prestuplenie” 
in Russian). “Suddenly, he stepped cautiously over the thre-
shold [and] closed the door carefully after him”.38 Svidrigailov 
haunts Raskolnikov in the second half of the novel, the latter 
constantly oscillating between the former’s egoism and Son-
ya’s Christian altruism. Svidrigailov’s egoism is bare, devoid of 
any qualification like “rational” that would ameliorate it, as in 
Chernyshevsky’s philosophy, and attune it to the collectivist 
ideal. I would like to argue that it is precisely Stirner’s egoism 
that is the source for modeling Svidrigailov’s bare egoism.
 Significantly, in the same way that Stirner accused Feuer-
bach of being a crypto-theologian for having offered anthro-
potheism rather than atheism - a common charge with which 
every Left Hegelian would label the others - in “Crime and Pu-
nishment,” Svidrigailov discerns and mocks the humanitarian 
and idealistic premises of Raskolnikov’s convictions. Cha-
racteristically on three occasions, he taunts Raskolnikov by 
calling him a Schiller, that is to say an idealist and romantic: 
“A Schiller, a Russian Schiller, no less.”39 A little later: “Every 
38 CP, Part 3, Ch. 6, p. 332.
39 CP, Part 6, Ch. 4, p 556. Malcolm Jones takes those references to Schiller to be evidence 
of Raskolnikov’s humanitarianism. See Malcolm Jones, “Raskolnikov’s Humanitarianism” in 
Raskolnikov and Svidrigailov, ed. Harold Bloom, (Chelsea House, USA, 2004), pp. 37-49.
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few moments that Schiller in you keeps getting into a tizzy.”40 
Despite Raskolnikov’s transgression, he still retains a residue 
of moral feeling, accompanied by an elevated belief in huma-
nity. And it is precisely here that his ordeal takes place. Svi-
drigailov once more discerns this and mocks Raskolnikov: “I 
understand the kind of problems that are currently on your 
mind: they are moral ones, aren’t they? Problems to do with 
man as citizen? Oh, put them to one side: why should you bo-
ther with them now? Hee, hee! Because you are still a man 
and a citizen?”41 Raskolnikov remains “a man and a citizen”, 
whereas Svidrigailov endorses an unqualified vision of man. 
When he first meets Raskolnikov, he cites the Latin poet Te-
rence: “If you will only bear in mind that I am a human being, 
et nihil humanum.”42 (The complete extract is: “Homo sum, et 
nihil humanum a me alienum puto”, which translates as: “I 
am a human being and consider nothing do with humanity 
outside my province.”)43 Svidrigailov’s vision of humanity is 
simultaneously broad and limited. It encompasses everything 
within the domain of the human condition without any moral, 
political or metaphysical qualification. At the same time, it is 
limited in the sense that the outcome of this, à la Stirner, is a 
diminution of the idea of Man to a bare and solipsistic egoism. 
And there is a strong anti-metaphysical tenor to Svidrigailov’s 
discourse, as reflected for example in his iconoclastic vision 
of eternity as a bathhouse, with which once more he provokes 
Raskolnikov.44
  If my reading is correct, Dostoevsky, by viewing the trajec-
tory of the radical intelligentsia’s thought in “Crime and Pu-
nishment” through the lens of the passage from Feuerbach to 
Stirner, turns the populism of the radicals on its head. What 
began as a humanistic transformation of theology into an-
thropology and an effort to ground a collective conception of 
40 CP, Part 6, Ch. 5, p. 559. See also CP, Part 6, Chapter 3, p. 554.
41 CP, Part 6, Ch. 4, p. 559.
42 CP, Part 4, Ch. 1, p. 337. Italics in the original.
43 CP, p. 237, note 5.
44 CP, Part 4, Ch. 1, p. 337.
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society on the concept of love of humanity, ends in a nihilistic 
and deeply asocial conception of Man. And, Dostoevsky not 
only charts this trajectory, he also presents it as inevitable. 
Chronicles of the Left Hegelian thought interpret the passage 
from Hegel to Stirner through Feuerbach, and the diminution 
and degeneration of Hegelianism into nihilism, as inexorable. 
Stirner appears as “the last link of the Hegelian system” for 
Avron,45 or “the ultimate logical consequence of Hegel’s histo-
rical system” for Lowith.46
  However, Dostoevsky does not merely employ Stirner’s 
egoism in order to undermine the traces of Feuerbach’s in-
fluence on the radical intelligentsia. He also delivers a sharp 
criticism to Stirner in the novel.  As I have argued, Svidrigailov’s 
bare egoism is a fictional rendering of Stirner’s conception of 
ego set, which is posited against the humanitarian and popu-
list element of Raskolnikov’s ideology. But it is precisely this 
bare egoism that has to be refuted as such. Svidrigailov falls 
in love with Dunia. And when he cannot possess the object of 
his desire, he uses bribery, blackmail and, in the last resort, 
violence. It would not be an exaggeration to label the scene 
between Svidrigailov and Dunia a Dostoevskian rendering of 
the struggle for recognition, as it is cast in the master and sla-
ve dialectic in Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit.” (Although it 
is possible Dostoevsky never read Hegel.)47 In this scene, Svi-
drigailov becomes aware of this “dialectical” interchange of 
roles when he wonders about himself: “Am I a monster or am 
I myself a victim?”48 Svidrigailov appears to be besotted with 
Dunia and thus unable to demonstrate the necessary emotio-
nal detachment from his appetites which, as we have seen in 
45 Henri Avron, “Max Stirner”, Paris 1954, cited in Lauwrence S. Stepelevich, “Max Stirner 
and Ludwig Feuerbach.” 
46Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 39, 1975, p. 451.
 Karl. Lowith, From Hegel to Nietzsche, (New York, 1964), p, 177. Cited in Lawrence Stepele-
vich, Max Stirner and Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 452, n. 3.
47 While Dostoevsky had probably never read Hegel, he would most likely have been familiar 
by hearsay with the fundamentals of Hegel’s philosophy. On this issue, see Malcolm Jones, 
“Some echoes of Hegel in Dostoevsky”, The Slavonic and East European Review, (vol. 49, no. 
117, Oct. 1971), pp. 500-520.
48 CP, Part 4, Ch. One, p. 337.
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Stirner’s philosophy, was a prerequisite for egoistic love. And 
when his love for Dunia is not reciprocated, when he cannot 
possess the object of his desire, he commits suicide. It is this 
love, this human, all too human love, the opposite of egoistic 
love, which becomes the Achilles heel of his egoism for it ma-
kes him realize the impossibility of a self-sufficient and solip-
sistic ego in a quintessentially inter-subjective world.
In “Crime and Punishment”, besides egoism, another semi-
nal idea of Stirner is refuted: the union of egoists, considered 
by its author as constituting the grounds for a society of the 
future. Just a few pages before Raskolnikov’s final conversion 
and repentance in the epilogue of the novel, Raskolnikov has a 
dream. In this dream people are infected with an unpreceden-
ted plague that makes them go insane:
“But never, never had people considered themselves so 
intelligent and in unswerving possession of the truth, as 
did those who became infected. Never had they believed so 
unswervingly in the correctness of their judgments, their 
scientific deductions, their moral convictions and beliefs… 
All were in a state of anxiety and no one could understand 
anyone else, each person thought that he alone possessed 
the truth and suffered agony as he looked at the others, bea-
ting his breast, weeping and wringing his hands. No one 
knew how to make the subject of judgment, or how to go 
about it, no one could agree about what should be conside-
red evil and what good.”49 
It would not be an exaggeration to construe this dystopian 
dream as a Dostoevskian refashioning of Hobbes’s state of 
nature. It signifies the relapsing of a society to a “bellum om-
nium contra omnia”, once the presumed solipsistic egoisms 
are in conflict and cannot reach a basic consensus as to “what 
should be considered evil and what good” in order to found 
a feasible society. This dystopian dream can be read as Dos-
toevsky’s fictional rendering of the impossibility of Stirner’s 
union of egoists. And it is significant that, after this dream 
Raskolnikov, realizes the futility of his ideas, more precisely 
the futility of the Napoleonic motive, and eventually genui-
nely repents.
49 CP, Epilogue, p. 626.
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To conclude we have seen how Dostoevsky perceived the 
trajectory of the Russian radical intelligentsia from Cherny-
shevsky to Pisarev as a reflection of the movement of Left-
-Hegelianism from Feuerbach to Stirner. Moreover, he dis-
cerned Feuerbach’s influence on Chernyshevsky and applied 
Stirner’s criticism of the former to the latter. He construed the 
degeneration of Chernyshevsky’s rational egoism to a bare, 
unqualified egoism, as is found in Stirner’s thinking, as ine-
vitable. But he did not merely employ Stirner’s thinking in 
order to criticize Chernyshevsky; he also challenged two of 
Stirner’s seminal ideas: egoistic love and the union of egoists. 
In other words, in Crime and Punishment, we find a reflection 
of how Hegel was received in Russia. “Previously there used 
to be Hegelians, now they are nihilists”, says Pavel Petrovich 
in Turgenev’s Fathers and Sons.50 In “Crime and Punishment” 
Dostoevsky finishes the “‘incomplete ideas” that are floating 
on the air” and draws them to their logical conclusions. After 
all, it was Dostoevsky who once wrote that “nihilism… is the 
last stage of idealism.”51
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